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Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) facilitate communication 
between brains and computers. As these devices become 
increasingly popular outside of the medical context, research 
interest in brain privacy risks and countermeasures has bloomed. 
Several neuroprivacy threats have been identified in the literature, 
including brain malware, personal data being contained in 
collected brainwaves and the inadequacy of legal regimes with 
regards to neural data protection. Dozens of controls have been 
proposed or implemented for protecting neuroprivacy, although it 
has not been immediately apparent what the landscape of 
neuroprivacy controls consists of. This paper inventories the 
implemented and proposed neuroprivacy risk mitigation 
techniques from open source repositories, BCI providers and the 
academic literature. These controls are mapped to the Hoepman 
privacy strategies and their implementation status is described. 
Several research directions for ensuring the protection of 
neuroprivacy are identified. 
CCS Concepts 
• Security and privacy➝Human and societal aspects of 
security and privacy➝Privacy protections 
Keywords 
Brain-Computer Interfaces; Brain Hacking; Neural Data 
Protection; Neurosecurity; Neuroprivacy; Privacy Controls 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Privacy concerns have come to the fore of public consciousness in 
recent years, with strict privacy regulations such as the California 
Consumer Privacy Act and the European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation making headlines and privacy controversies 
such as the Snowden revelations and Facebook’s Cambridge 
Analytica scandal roiling popular trust in government and 
commercial institutions. In recent decades, researchers have 
shown heightened interest in anticipating and documenting 
privacy threats to the human brain and mind involving the use of 
Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs). There is much discussion of 
neurosecurity and neuroprivacy risks and controls, although it is 
unclear what is being done to develop and make widely available 
privacy controls for protecting the privacy of people who utilize 
BCIs. 
This paper seeks to summarize the current state of neuroprivacy 
controls implementation, utilizing the Hoepman privacy strategies 
as its control taxonomy [21]. Although brain security and privacy 
scholars have identified many privacy controls for the brain, there 
has yet to be an inventory of theoretical and implemented 
neuroprivacy controls that are classified into privacy control 
families. This study found that few privacy controls have moved 
beyond their theoretical formulations and that no open source 
solutions exist for individuals wanting to protect themselves from 
brain hackers. A novel classification and inventory of BCI privacy 
controls is offered, along with discussion of research gaps in 
developing compensating controls for neuroprivacy risk. 
Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs) are devices that enable 
bidirectional or unidirectional communication between brains and 
computers [33]. These devices may or may not be additionally 
classifiable as neuroprosthetics depending on whether they are 
integrated into the neural circuitry of the organism [19]. 
Applications of BCIs range from diagnosing diseases and 
restoring bodily functions to remotely controlling robots, lie 
detection, authentication and gaming, among others [33]. 
Electroencephalography (EEG) is a low-cost and non-invasive 
method for obtaining neural data, in use by various consumer BCI 
headset providers such as Muse, NeuroSky and Emotiv. Various 
other methods for obtaining neural data as well as methods for 
stimulating the brain with BCIs were discussed in [4]. 
Brain-computer interfaces can be classified according to the 
direction(s) communication flows – BCIs can record from the 
brain, stimulate the brain or both record from and stimulate the 
brain [33]. These interfaces can also be ranked according to their 
invasiveness in relation to the brain – invasive BCIs are situated 
within the brain, semi-invasive BCIs on the brain surface or 
nerves and non-invasive BCIs outside of the skin of the head and 
skull [33]. A design classification for BCIs – between passive, 
active, reactive and hybrid – also exists, which makes distinctions 
according to whether the initiator of the neural data acquisition is 
the device or the person and the nature of their interaction [4]. A 
novel five-phase BCI cycle was proposed that explains the high-
level signal processing steps involved with neural data acquisition 
and neural stimulation, which is useful for neurosecurity threat 
modeling [4]. 
Privacy is difficult to define, but at a high level can be thought of 
as “the relief from a range of kinds of social friction” [35]. 
Adapting this definition to BCIs, neuroprivacy can be thought of 
as relief from social friction stemming from the processing of 
neural data. The original neuroprivacy article defined 
neuroprivacy as privacy concerns of neurodiagnostic and 
neuroimaging techniques [31]. “Privacy of thoughts and feelings” 
has been identified as one of the seven types of privacy, inspired 
by the privacy issues of neurotechnology [17]. Another author has 
identified issues related to BCI-enabled blackmail and decisional 
interference (loss of autonomy), which are privacy harms within 
Solove’s taxonomy [23]. Since insecurity is a privacy harm, 
neurosecurity issues that result in social friction for the data 
subject can also be thought of as neuroprivacy issues. 
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Neuroprivacy concerns represent a unique and pressing challenge 
for privacy professionals as the mind becomes ever more 
connected and discernible with advances in neurotechnology. 
There is uncertainty as to whether data protection regimes can 
adequately address neuroprivacy concerns [20], and other scholars 
have identified a lack of basic privacy protections such as 
applications having excessive access to personal information in 
popular BCI headsets [39]. There was one application that sent 
users’ raw EEG data to cloud storage, potentially allowing 
unknown parties to extract sensitive personal information from 
users’ brainwaves at some point in the future. Obtaining informed 
consent from the users of BCIs is particularly difficult due to 
previously collected EEG data having the potential to later be 
processed in novel ways that allows extraction of information that 
was not possible before due to advancements in the methods used 
to process EEG signals [37]. The neural data extracted with BCIs 
is inherently personal – each person’s brainwaves are unique [37] 
and change little over their lifetime [14] and may contain sensitive 
information such as religiosity [25], drowsiness levels [40] and 
“guilty knowledge” [33], among other aspects of cognition. 
The original neurosecurity paper defined neurosecurity as “the 
protection of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of neural 
devices from malicious parties with the goal of preserving the 
safety of a person’s neural mechanisms, neural computation, and 
free will” [13]. Another researcher has proposed the term 
“neurocrime” to refer to criminal activities that involve neural 
information [23]. “Brain spyware” has been demonstrated in the 
lab, illustrating that brain hackers can deduce private information 
such as banking information, recognized faces, PIN numbers, 
location of residency and month of birth from the brains of BCI 
users by showing them visual stimuli and using a machine 
learning model to detect familiar information based on the brain’s 
response [28]. This type of attack can also be performed 
subliminally, without the conscious awareness of the target [18]. 
Brain hacking scholars are anticipating the growing significance 
and complexity of these privacy and security threats [4], as novel 
architectures for neurotechnology enable technology-assisted 
telepathy [7], using thoughts to remote-control animals [41] and 
the emergence of a global “Internet of Neurons” [34]. 
Hoepman distilled the privacy design literature into eight distinct 
kinds of strategies made up of 26 tactics, which address various 
high-level requirements of data protection regulation [10, 11, 21, 
22]. His privacy design strategies and tactics have been proposed 
as a potential control taxonomy for mitigating privacy risks [11]. 
Although intended to categorize privacy design patterns, 
Hoepman envisioned that his taxonomy could be used to analyze 
the privacy impact of information systems more generally [21], 
suggesting that it is an appropriate framework for understanding 
neuroprivacy risks and controls. 
The first four strategies – Minimize, Separate, Abstract and Hide 
– are data-oriented strategies, dealing with the architectural 
considerations of privacy described in [36]. Architectures that 
support less identifiability and less centricity promote stronger 
privacy. Identifiability is the ease with which personal data can be 
linked to a natural person, while centricity is the degree to which 
an organization’s network systems enable control over the data 
subject’s information [36]. The tactics within these four strategies 
can be thought of as specific techniques for reducing centricity 
and identifiability in an organization’s architecture. The remaining 
four strategies – Inform, Control, Enforce and Demonstrate – are 
process-oriented, or privacy-by-policy, strategies [21]. They are 
organizational processes and procedures for promoting strong 
privacy [22]. Inform and Control are strategies that focus on 
empowering the data subject, whereas Demonstrate and Enforce 
focus on the role of the data controller in maintaining privacy 
protections. 
The existing brain hacking literature identifies numerous privacy 
and security controls that could be deployed to mitigate risks 
related to the use of BCI technology. However, these controls 
have not been organized under a privacy control taxonomy such 
as the Hoepman strategies. The rest of this paper is as follows: 
Section 2 discusses the methodology for inventorying the 
neuroprivacy controls; Section 3 contains the results; Section 4 
discusses the results, while concluding remarks are in Section 5. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
For a piece of research to be included in this inventory, it had to 
contain at least one concrete, specific action an individual or 
organization could take to protect neuroprivacy; be from an 
academic database; be available for reading, either through library 
subscriptions or be openly available for download; and be readily 
traceable from the neurosecurity and neuroprivacy literature or 
from searches for relevant keywords in the titles of the articles. 
Only controls mentioned within the context of BCIs were 
included in the inventory – the neuroprosthetics literature was not 
included, such as the neurosecurity controls mentioned in [19]. 
Controls were classified into four categories: academic, 
commercial, open source and theorized. Academic controls have 
been demonstrated in research labs; commercial controls were 
countermeasures that were known to be in use by BCI providers; 
open source controls were tools that were hosted on openly 
available repositories; and theorized controls were those 
mentioned in the literature, but had not been implemented in 
academia, in industry or by individuals maintaining open source 
solutions. For theorized controls, only the earliest citation was 
used, and all citations were presented if multiple independent 
researchers proposed or implemented the control during the same 
year. The Hoepman strategies were loosely interpreted when 
possible, which included counting security tools that could be 
used to indirectly protect personal data as privacy tools. Security 
controls that were not classifiable as Hoepman controls were 
given a “Non-Hoepman” security control designation. The 
Smartphone Brain Scanner openPDS system described in [37] was 
accounted for as a collection of separate, constituent privacy 
controls rather than one large privacy control that spanned 
multiple Hoepman tactics and families. 
Mentions of security or privacy controls for BCI devices on 
certain code repositories and commercial BCI provider websites 
were also included in this study. The following BCI provider 
domains were searched for security, privacy and data protection in 
the context of BCIs or neural data: 
• BioSemi (https://www.biosemi.com) 
• Emotiv (https://www.emotiv.com) 
• Halo Neuro (https://www.haloneuro.com) 
• Kokoon (https://kokoon.io) 
• Muse (https://choosemuse.com) 
• MyndPlay (https://myndplay.com) 
• NeuroOptimal (https://neuroptimal.com) 
• NeuroSky (http://neurosky.com) 
• OpenBCI (https://openbci.com) 
These providers’ privacy policies and other web pages from the 
domains listed above were analyzed for any sort of privacy 
protections that specifically dealt with neural data or BCI device 
privacy protections. Only four of the nine providers listed above 
dealt specifically with neuroprivacy issues in their privacy 
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notices: Emotiv, Kokoon, Muse and NeuroSky. For NeuroSky, 
neural data processing was discussed in the privacy notice of the 
Effective Learner App, but not in the main privacy notice. With 
regards to all privacy notices, protections that explicitly 
generalized to covering all personal data of which EEG data was a 
specified type were included in the inventory by default, even if it 
was unlikely that those protections applied to neural data. For 
instance, a BCI provider that stated that EEG data is personal data 
and that they will allow the data subject to correct inaccuracies in 
their personal data were classified in the inventory as allowing the 
correction of EEG data unless there was an explicit exception for 
EEG data. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, all privacy notices 
were interpreted literally. In addition to BCI provider websites, 
the following code repositories were searched for mention of open 
source privacy or security tools that are explicitly for protecting 
EEG data or BCI devices: 
• GitHub (https://github.com) 
• GitLab (https://gitlab.com) 
• BitBucket (https://bitbucket.org) 
• SourceForge (https://sourceforge.net) 
• LaunchPad (https://launchpad.net) 
3. RESULTS 
This section begins with a general overview of the findings, 
followed by six subsections describing the controls, sorted by 
their Hoepman classifications. In total, 94 neuroprivacy controls 
were identified from the literature, BCI provider websites and in 
code repositories. Figures 1 through 3 were generated from this 
collected data and were designed to answer the following research 
questions: 
• What proportion of neuroprivacy controls have 
implementations and what is the relative distribution of 
implementation types? 
• What is the relative control distribution among the eight 
Hoepman privacy strategies? 
• What is the proportion of each control group that has 
been implemented? 
Figure 1 illustrates the relative distribution of controls based on 
whether they were theorized, academic, commercial or open 
source. This inventory revealed that most neuroprivacy controls 
are theoretical, with 30% in use by BCI providers. There were two 
controls, blockchain and Secure Multiparty Computation, that 
have been implemented in the lab [1-3]. There was a single open 
source solution, Open Brain Consent, which is a template for 
obtaining consent from research participants for research that 
involves neural data collection [32]. Figure 2 shows the relative 
distribution of the 94 controls according to their Hoepman 
classifications. There were seven controls that could not be 
classified under the Hoepman strategies, so were given the 
“Security” designation. The most represented techniques were 
those in the Hide and Demonstrate strategies, making up 18% and 
22% of the controls respectively. Enforce, Separate and Abstract 
were the least represented controls, with five or fewer controls 
each. Figure 3 shows the relative distribution of neuroprivacy 
controls that have been implemented. Implemented controls were 
any controls that were not categorized as theorized. In total, just 
under 30% (28) of the 94 controls identified were implemented. 
Of the privacy strategies, only the Abstract strategy lacked any 
implemented controls, and the Enforce strategy had the highest 
proportion of implemented controls (80%). 
There were seven controls identified that were not classifiable as 
Hoepman controls, none of which have been implemented in the 
context of BCIs. Adversarial training, architecture modifications, 
defense distillation and ensemble method are techniques for 
hardening machine learning models against exploitation [4]. 
These techniques would involve protecting the algorithm(s) 
responsible for decoding intentions in neural data acquisition and 
those responsible for encoding neural firing patterns in 
neurostimulators. Other proposed neurosecurity controls included 
utilizing robust programming languages, malware visualization 
and compilation techniques and options [4]. 
 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of Existing Neuroprivacy Controls by 
Type 
 




























Figure 3. Distribution of Controls by Implementation Status 
The Minimize strategy limits as much as possible the processing 
of personal data [11]. Of the twelve Minimize controls identified, 
only one was implemented: BCI providers stating in their privacy 
notices that personal data is retained only as long as necessary, 
which presumably applies to neural data as well [26, 29, 30]. A 
similar and cheaper control would be deleting neural data 
regularly as it becomes unnecessary [6]. Limiting retention of 
neural data was not universal among the BCI providers, as Emotiv 
explicitly stated in their privacy notice that they retain EEG data 
indefinitely [15]. Minimize can also be realized by selectively 
choosing what personal data to process or by refusing to process 
personal data. The use of directional antennas and low 
transmission power could limit the processing of personal data in 
physical space [4]. Utilizing whitelists, running apps with lowest 
privileges and designing platforms to only have necessary features 
are methods for being selective about which neural data will be 
processed and limiting the processing to relevant parties and 
applications [4]. Methods for not processing certain neural data 
included blacklists [4], traffic filtering [34] and input sanitization 
and validation [34]. Safe APIs and languages were proposed as a 
way to automate input sanitization and validation [4]. Most of the 
proposed Minimize controls are familiar from the cybersecurity 
field, with the exception of the BCI Anonymizer [5, 9]. This tool 
has been proposed as a way to remove private information from 
EEG data before they are stored or transmitted [5], although it has 
not been invented as suggested by the abandoned status of the 
BCI Anonymizer patent application [9]. Several issues with the 
BCI Anonymizer idea have been identified, including resource 
constraints in BCI devices, lack of access to proprietary 
algorithms, lack of a clear method for separating private 
information from intentions and a general lack of any 
implementation details [39]. 
Separate involves isolating or distributing the processing of 
personal data as much as possible to prevent correlation [11]. 
Only five Separate controls were identified in this inventory. 
Keeping the data subject’s pseudonymization ID separate from 
their neural data was the only Separate control with a real-world 
implementation [15]. Other proposed techniques for promoting 
isolation in BCIs included application sandboxing [34] and 
segmented application architectures [4]. Suggestions for 
distributing neural data processing across physical locations 
included utilizing an external device for authorizing neural 
stimulation [4] and keeping EEG data under the control of the end 
user through the use of a locally hosted Personal Data Store (PDS) 
[37]. Abstract techniques limit the detail in which personal data is 
processed [11]. This strategy had the fewest proposed controls of 
any strategy and was the only one that did not have any real-world 
implementations. Adding noise to EEG data before applications 
can process it could decrease the risk of personal data leaks [28]. 
Differential privacy is a specific application of noise addition that 
could be deployed in BCIs to deidentify brainwaves [39]. Personal 
Data Stores could be equipped with capabilities for aggregate 
computation of neural data across multiple PDS instances and 
summarizing EEG data into high-level attributes by reducing the 
dimensionality of the data [37]. 
The Hide strategy reduces the identifiability of personal data and 
prevents it from becoming public or known [11]. This strategy 
had a total of six implementations, five commercial and one 
academic. Emotiv encrypts neural data at rest and in transit [15]. 
There were two BCI providers that anonymize neural data by 
removing any associated identifying information [29, 30]. Emotiv 
utilizes pseudonymization, which involves processing neural data 
with a unique identifier rather than directly attributing the neural 
data to the data subject [15]. NeuroSky, Muse and Kokoon limit 
access to neural data based on a “need to know” [26, 29, 30]. 
Secure Multiparty Computation was demonstrated in the lab to 
allow estimation of driver drowsiness without exposing any 
individual user’s EEG data [1, 2]. Proposed Hide techniques 
included fine-grained context-based access control [27], 
maintaining different permission granularity [4] and restricted 
APIs [28], all of which could be used to limit access to neural 
data. Functional encryption and homomorphic encryption have 
been suggested as potential methods for obfuscating raw EEG 
data or the extracted features [39]. Application hardening could be 
used to make BCI software more difficult to reverse engineer, 
increasing the difficulty of brain exploitation [4]. Mix techniques 
reduce the risk of unwanted correlation and could include 
randomization [39], utilizing mix networks such as The Onion 
Router [34] and using spread spectrum for enhanced wireless 
security [4]. Mental firewalls and mental encryption are 
theoretical controls unique to neuroprivacy. As BCIs are equipped 
with advanced brain-to-brain communication capabilities, there 
will be a need to protect against “malicious brainwaves,” which 
could compromise the integrity of the mind [34]. Restricting 
access to the mind or specific parts of the mind could be achieved 
with a firewall that is designed to filter brainwaves. Mental 
encryption would involve using a person’s cognition as part of an 
algorithm for encrypting their brainwaves, although it is unclear 
how this would work in practice [34]. 
The Inform strategy empowers the data subject by informing them 
about the processing of their personal data [11]. Inform was the 
third most represented Hoepman strategy with 14 controls, of 
which eight were implemented. Having a privacy notice that 
discusses neuroprivacy concerns can be thought of as the 
foundational control in this strategy. The four BCI providers that 
mentioned neuroprivacy issues in their privacy notices – Emotiv, 
Kokoon, Muse and NeuroSky – each disclose neural data 
processing details, inform data subjects of changes to the notice, 
and direct data subjects with privacy questions to the proper 
contact [15, 26, 29, 30]. Other Inform controls that were present 
in BCI provider privacy notices included explaining why neural 
data is processed [15, 26, 30] as well as stating that regulators [26, 
































of a breach. The Open Brain Consent form is an open source 
template for a privacy notice and consent form that can be 
furnished to research participants whose neural data will be 
collected [32]. Researchers have identified a need for using 
accessible language in BCI privacy disclosures [6] and explaining 
all neural data processing in clear and plain language [37], 
although only dedicated research, such as analyzing the reading 
difficulty of BCI provider privacy notices, could discern whether 
this has been carried out in practice. The data subject could also 
receive regular reminders of the status of the neural data 
processing that affects them [37]. End user BCI security training 
[24], security demos and serious games [24] and subliminal 
stimuli awareness [18] have been proposed as controls for 
informing the data subject about brain hacking risks and defense. 
These measures can be considered Inform controls insofar as they 
provide information on how the data subject’s brains could be 
manipulated by adversaries, as this manipulation is a form of 
neural data processing. 
Control techniques allow data subjects to control aspects of the 
processing of their personal data [11]. The majority of Control 
techniques, six of nine, were implemented. The BCI providers had 
statements regarding revocation of consent and the rights of the 
data subject to access, port and update or correct personal data, 
which presumably apply to neural data as well [15, 26, 29, 30]. 
Kokoon stated that all neural data processing was explicitly opt-in 
[26], and all providers besides Emotiv implied that neural data 
could be retracted [26, 29, 30]. Proposed controls in this strategy 
include easy opt-out mechanisms for data subjects [6], obtaining 
informed consent for neural data processing [6] and allowing the 
data subject to retain control of their neural data through the use 
of a Personal Data Store [37]. Obtaining informed consent was 
marked as unimplemented due to the concerns that have been 
raised over whether this is theoretically possible for raw EEG data 
[37]. The Enforce strategy is concerned with the privacy policy of 
the organization [11]. Enforce had the highest percentage of 
implemented controls at four of five of those identified. Privacy 
notices and privacy policies are two different pieces of 
documentation – the former informs the data subject about data 
processing [8] and the latter is an internal piece of governance 
documentation [12]. Every BCI provider that discussed EEG data 
processing in its privacy notice was assumed to have also 
implemented an internal privacy policy that covers EEG data 
processing to some degree [15, 26, 29, 30]. Other implemented 
Enforce controls included ensuring employees comply with the 
privacy notice [15], ensuring service providers comply with the 
privacy notice [15, 26, 29, 30] and training all employees on 
requirements under legal regimes [16]. The privacy addendum 
was proposed as a mechanism for managing neuroprivacy risk 
associated with third parties such as BCI application developers 
[6]. The addendum requires adherence to a set of BCI Privacy 
Principles and would be included as a contractual requirement in 
various circumstances. 
Demonstrate controls involve verifying and showing that personal 
data is being processed in compliance with privacy expectations 
[11]. It was the most represented Hoepman strategy in this 
inventory with 21 unique controls, only two of which have been 
implemented: Emotiv conducts internal audits for compliance 
with their privacy notice [15] and a blockchain platform that is 
capable of detecting violations of EEG data integrity was 
demonstrated in the lab [3]. Similar methods for ensuring neural 
data integrity could include those familiar from the cybersecurity 
field, namely checksums, digital signatures, hash functions and 
message authentication codes [34]. Brain antivirus would prevent, 
detect and respond to brain malware [4]. An external stimuli 
monitor would allow the data subject to review stimuli for 
malicious content [4] and “detecting rapid screen changes” 
through the use of a subliminal stimuli detector would allow for 
the detection and review of malicious subliminal content [18]. 
Another control that could screen stimuli for malicious content is 
code analysis techniques that can determine the legitimacy of any 
stimuli presented [38]. Analyzing the physical medium for 
exploitation attempts could help thwart jamming attacks [4]. 
Various other types of detection have been proposed, such as 
intrusion detection systems [4], malicious noise detection [24], 
inconsistent classification detection [24], machine learning-based 
anomaly detection of malware [4] and machine learning-based 
inconsistency detection of processing [4]. Feedback mechanisms 
for undesired and uninitiated output would allow BCI users to 
alert BCI providers, law enforcement or other outside parties to 
potential neural tampering or device malfunction, which may be 
desirable for sensitive uses of neurotechnology such as 
rehabilitation where the risk of physical or psychological harm is 
high [24]. Auditing techniques could include periodic 
configuration reviews and updates [4], verifying the legitimacy of 
BCI software [6] and ensuring a Personal Data Store system 
allows for the auditing of neural data access [37]. Tracking neural 
data access, usage and flow throughout systems could promote 
accountability [27]. 
4. DISCUSSION 
It was not apparent prior to this study that nearly one hundred 
neuroprivacy controls have been discussed or implemented, and 
that neuroprivacy controls spanning all eight Hoepman strategies 
have been proposed, with at least one real-world implementation 
in each control family except for Abstract. There were 
unimplemented controls in each of the eight strategies and there 
may be many more controls that have not been theorized yet 
within each strategy. Implemented controls could be improved by 
deploying tools that are purely academic such as Secure 
Multiparty Computation [1, 2] and the blockchain platform [3]. 
As malware and privacy attacks become more severe and 
commonplace in the context of BCIs, it is imperative that robust 
security and privacy solutions such as intrusion detection systems 
and brain antivirus are developed, widely deployed and made 
available to all data subjects and BCI providers. 
The most difficult controls to actualize may be those in the 
Minimize and Abstract strategies, as both control families face 
research challenges. Minimize controls such as the BCI 
Anonymizer, blacklists and whitelists require being able to make a 
distinction between necessary and unnecessary EEG data, with no 
proposed methods existing in the literature for making this 
distinction. Even if algorithms are developed for classifying 
neural data in this way, BCI devices may not be able to support 
the control due to BCI resource constraints or BCI providers not 
wanting to reveal their proprietary feature extraction algorithms 
[39]. Abstract controls that involve adding noise to EEG data, 
such as differential privacy, face theoretical challenges. The 
accuracy of EEG data may be important to the BCI application in 
question, meaning these controls would directly conflict with the 
primary functionality of the system [28]. 
Perhaps one of the hard problems of neuroprivacy is that of 
obtaining informed consent for neural data processing. 
Adequately informing the data subject about neuroprivacy risks 
related to raw EEG data processing may be impossible due to the 
complexity of neural data and unforeseen advancements in data 
extraction [37]. If obtaining informed consent for raw neural data 
81
processing is impossible, then perhaps informed consent can only 
practically be achieved by alerting the data subject to this 
impossibility. A related problem is deciding whether and how to 
inform the data subject about brain hacking risks, such as the 
possibilities of brain malware and subliminal probing. Providing 
such information to users of BCI headsets, although a potentially 
disturbing or frightening subject for some, may be important 
information for data subjects to consider when making an 
informed decision to use a BCI headset. Privacy notices could 
limit such discussion to the attacks that have been demonstrated 
by researchers, such as those in [18, 28], and include information 
about what the BCI provider is doing to prevent, detect and 
respond to such brain hacking threats. 
Secure file deletion for neural data, secure neural data deletion, 
could be deployed for decreasing the likelihood of forensic 
recovery of neural data from storage devices. Expanding the 
current suite of Control techniques could involve allowing the 
data subject granular choices regarding the neural data that will be 
processed, which could involve allowing the data subject to 
customize which personal information contained in their EEG 
data they want to share or limiting data acquisition to a specific 
time of day, location or context. If a BCI application is a 
neurogame whose business model is monetizing the collected 
neural data of the players instead of charging a fee to participate, 
the application could offer a paid alternative for any privacy-
conscious users who want to opt out of the monetization of their 
brainwaves. A novel Inform control could involve layering the 
privacy notice based on the type of personal data under 
discussion, with a dedicated section or page for neural data 
processing details. Ordering the notice in this manner would allow 
concerned data subjects to quickly learn about the neural data 
processing practices of the BCI provider without having to 
consume the whole privacy notice. Other potential Enforce 
controls include pursuing strong neuroprivacy as a strategic goal 
for the organization, treating neural data as a business asset and 
regularly reviewing the privacy policy for alignment with the 
organization’s neuroprivacy strategy. 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The future is full of research opportunities for protecting 
neuroprivacy, with the majority of controls proposed in the 
literature without publicly known implementations. Several future 
work possibilities were identified for implementing and 
improving upon cybersecurity and privacy solutions for protecting 
the brain. Those in charge of neuroprivacy risk management could 
benefit from extensive control catalogs, including a vibrant 
ecosystem of competing providers and open source solutions 
when deciding how to allocate resources for privacy controls. 
Brain-computer interface users who want to mitigate their own 
neuroprivacy risk could also benefit from a plethora of open 
source solutions or paid options. Future work could adapt insights 
from various areas of technical privacy – including smartphone 
privacy controls, medical device privacy controls and the broader 
privacy-enhancing technologies literature – to brainstorm novel 
neuroprivacy controls and eventually establish a comprehensive 
library of neuroprivacy controls. 
More research could be done to evaluate how current BCI 
providers handle neuroprivacy risks. For instance, in-depth studies 
could be performed to determine whether the reading level of 
current BCI privacy notices is accessible to the majority of BCI 
users and whether those notices accurately reflect the risks of 
neural data processing. Researchers could also investigate the 
current usability of neuroprivacy mechanisms such as opt-outs 
within BCI apps to better understand if maintaining neuroprivacy 
is challenging from the data subject’s perspective. Additionally, 
more clarification is needed regarding what traditional data 
protection rights, such as those involving data portability, access 
and deletion, consist of in the context of neuroprivacy. The right 
to have inaccuracies in one’s personal data corrected is 
particularly challenging to conceptualize in the context of neural 
data [20]. Dialogues such as these could help spur innovations in 
neuroprivacy whilst illuminating the most pressing neuroprivacy 
challenges of today. 
Preemptively addressing neuroprivacy risks through the 
development and deployment of BCI privacy controls is key to 
protecting the rights and freedoms of the data subjects. Perhaps 
most importantly, it will help avert brain hacking versions of 
traumatic privacy violations, such as the Snowden revelations or 
Facebook’s Cambridge Analytica scandal, whatever a “neuro” 
version of such events would look like. Brain-computer interface 
providers, as part of their privacy risk management efforts, will 
need neuroprivacy control taxonomies and catalogs to 
operationalize privacy protections for their users. Regulators will 
need assurance that data protection regimes are being adhered to 
with regards to neural data processing, and data subjects will want 
assurance that their minds and brains are safe from privacy 
violations. This paper inventoried the existing neuroprivacy 
controls, serving as a starting point for researchers, BCI 
companies, data subjects and regulators to understand what 
mechanisms currently exist for mitigating brain privacy risks and 
indicated gaps where further innovation and research is necessary. 
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